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Abstract 
 
Transport has always been, and will continue to be, a means to serve to eradicate 
world inequalities bringing relief and salvation across the globe and no transport 
mode more so perhaps than aviation.  However, aviation has served as both the 
salvation and the aggressor, having also itself been the victim of terrorist attacks.  
Arguably (to date) in 2016, the world could consider itself fortunate not to have 
witnessed a devastating cyber-terrorist attack on an aircraft. Certainly concerns were 
raised after the disappearance of MH370 in terms of cockpit tampering; and yet, these 
reports only touched upon the surface of an effervescing iceberg – set to erupt into a 
tsunami of devastation. The question inevitably remains ‘when’ rather than ‘if’ this 
will occur. This research reviews the vulnerability of air travel and the preparedness 
of the industry in terms of coordination (prevention and protection) from the 
perspective of policy, legislation (regulation) and organisation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Transport remains essential to humanities very survival, as was commented upon,  
‘Transport is fundamental to our economy and society.  Mobility is vital to the 
….. quality of life of citizens as they enjoy their freedom to travel…. Transport 
is global, so effective action requires strong international cooperation’ (COM 
2011/144 Final). 
 
The United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) relate to a vision 
for humanity as well as a social contract between the people of the world.  And, 
whilst sustainability remains the cross cutting focus, the aspect of mobilisation of 
resources and technology is viewed as a critical aspect in realising development and 
ultimately pursuing related goals.2 The overall aim of which is to ‘banish a whole host 
of social ills by 2030.’  However, as old challenges are addressed, new ones 
ultimately develop and become the fresh nemesis to be tackled, which ultimately 
require international cooperation.  
 
The importance of transport to the attainment of the SDG’s has often been overlooked 
and the security of such a vital world component is too often compromised. Transport 
remains a way of uniting the world and is an invaluable and irreplaceable asset to the 
highly globalised society we live in.  Hence transport requires protection – alongside 
the critical infrastructure that supports it. Yet, of late, it has become a target of attack 
and a means of striking fear into users and the greater society it serves. 
 
There is no doubt that transport has often stood at a crossroads whereby it has been 
used to take lives and save lives.  On a global perspective, one such challenge remains 
the alarming number of deaths attributed to road transport; whilst, the use of aircraft 
in warfare has equally resulted in the unacceptable loss of countless lives through acts 
of purposeful aggression (Fox 2014a). This research paper directly relates to this latter 
and relatively new mode, aviation, which whilst being engaged in aggressive acts, has 
also brought salvation to many, through humanitarian relief aid. Yet this division has 
become blurred, with civil aviation being a victim of terrorist attacks and aircraft 
being used as a weapon of destruction (Fox 2014a). It remains a fact that air transport, 
arguably, more so than any other transport, serves to eradicate world inequalities, it 
has shrunk the world and has been a key player in quickening the pace of 
globalisation. Economies, societies and cultures have become more than ever 
intertwined because of this connectivity (Fox 2014a). Trade networks are essential to 
global integration and hence, communications and transportation are fundamental 
enablers and constituents, imperative to world integration.  However, the mixture of 
both of these key aspects could also lead to devastation; and, debatably (to date) in 
2016, the world could consider itself fortunate not to have witnessed a devastating 
cyber-terrorist attack on or against an aircraft. The raising of concerns as to the 
vulnerability of aviation is not new (Fox 2014a). Press reports were particularly 
significant in this respect after the disappearance of MH370, whereby, certainly, the 
                                                        
2 Agenda 21 made specific reference to transport in several of the chapters, for example Chapter 9 on 
Atmosphere and Chapter 7 on Human Settlement. At the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development (Rio+20) the ‘Future We Want’ outcome document emphasised that transport and 
mobility had a crucial role to play in sustainable living. 
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potential of cockpit tampering was raised3; and yet, these reports arguably only 
touched upon the surface of this issue and the potential for devastation, as witnessed 
for instance, in and on the scale of the 9/11 terrorist atrocities.  The question 
inevitably remains how vulnerable and prepared is civil aviation? And, is it a case, of 
‘when’ rather than ‘if’ this will occur?  Certainly this remains a new challenge in 
terms of social ills against a transport mode, and hence society. 
 
This article therefore undertakes analysis and reflection of the challenges faced by 
aviation in terms of cyber-attacks, specifically focusing on terrorism through 
cyberspace. Initial reflection is provided through means of a contextualised 
background before the response of a coordinated approach is considered in terms of 
preparedness and a framework to tackle cyber-attacks and terrorism. Ultimately the 
paper concludes by considering aviation and the need of such in terms of facing the 
future. 
 
The paper is presented through the discipline of law and is structured in the following 
way: (as per Chart 1) 
 
 
Chart 1: Structure of the paper 
(Author) 
 
 
2. TERRORISM 
 
Terrorism is far from a new phenomenon, arguably when it actually began remains 
contestable. The root of the word comes from a Latin term which means ‘to frighten’ 
                                                        
3 The Telegraph. Jonathan Pearlman. ‘MH370: New evidence of cockpit tampering as investigation 
into missing plane continues.’ 29 June, 2014. Sydney, Australia. 
Also see: S. J. Fox (2015) CONTEST’ing Chicago origins and reflections: lest we forget! Int. J. Private 
Law, Vol. 8, No.1, 2015 pp 73-98. 
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and is traceable back to 105BC when ‘terror cimbricus’ was a state of panic applied 
in response to an attack by the Cimbri tribe. During the French Revolution the term, 
‘a reign of terror’ was also applied, although, somewhat ironically perhaps as imposed 
by a government.4  
  
Sergey Nechayev is said to have described himself as a ‘terrorist’ later founding in 
1869, the ‘People’s Retribution’ organisation (Avery 2010).5 Today, the associated 
word is hence linked to this application, and the term ‘terrorist’ remains a word 
associated with a group (or individual) who carries out atrocities, which normally has 
as a result, the loss of innocent lives and/or mass destruction. In more recent times 
such acts have been taken against a State and have increasingly been targeted at high 
profile areas – which has included transport and its supporting infrastructure.   
 
2.1. International Legal Instruments - Timelines: origins and developments 
Terrorism is recognised worldwide by States, and hence has been on the international 
agenda since 1934.  The League of Nations, the forerunner to the United Nations 
(UN), actually began drafting a convention for the prevention and punishment of 
terrorism, at this time, although it was never actually to result in the instrument 
coming into force. 
 
Since 1963, the international community (through the UN) has been actively involved 
in formulating universal legal instruments to prevent terrorist acts.6 Such mechanisms 
have also been specifically aimed at identified industries (such as the atomic sector) 
and have therefore been developed by the UN and its specialised agencies, such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this respect, the illegal transport of 
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons (and related material) has also become 
subject to international agreement. Furthermore, transport too has necessitated special 
recognition regarding the vulnerability to terrorist attack, in particular the modes of 
maritime and aviation, and hence, the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) and International Maritime Organisation have been actively involved in 
developing security measures and actions to counter terrorism. 
In terms of aviation, for example, this resulted in the Hague Convention of 1970 for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft7 and the Montreal Convention of 
1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aircraft.8 
 
Although, arguably, there remains no worldwide-accepted definition of terrorism (Fox 
2015; Blackbourn et al. 2012: Weinberg et al. 2004; Saul 2005) in December 1972 the 
UN Sixth Committee referred to the need to take, 
‘Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes 
innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study the 
                                                        
4 Hwa Chong Institution www2.hci.edu.sg [Accessed 8 April, 2016]. 
In this respect the Reign of Terror was instigated by Maxmillien Robespierra, who was one of twelve 
heads of government and used the justification of such as a necessity to transform the state from a 
monarchy to liberal democracy. 
www.crimemuseum.org 
5 Martin Avery (2010) ‘Muskoka Terror G8: Activist and Terrorist From Huntsville to Algonquin 
Park’ Lulu.com. Also see www.encyclopedia.com/article-1G2-3426400063/nechayev-sergei.html 
[Accessed 9 April, 2016] 
6 un.org [Accessed 8 April, 2016] 
7 United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 22, part 2 (1971), p. 1644. See FN 13 
8 Ibid., vol. 22, part 2 (1973), p. 1644. See FN 13. 
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underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in 
misery frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to 
sacrifice human lives, including their own in an attempt to effect radical 
change.’9  
 
This Resolution affirmed the need for international cooperation to tackle actions that 
strike at liberty and freedom, and, which invariably transcends boundaries and 
borders. But, it was not until the 1980’s that the UN Security Council actually began 
to refer more specifically to ‘terrorism.’10 This also was to coincide with specific, 
direct targeting against aviation. 
 
The 1990’s also saw fortification of the need for a cooperative worldwide approach 
through the adoption of Resolution A/RES/49/60 at the 84th Plenary meeting.11 Within 
it, reinforcement was given to need to address, ‘criminal acts intended or calculated 
to provoke a state of terror in the general public’…… where the circumstances were 
‘unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.’12 
 
The Annex of the Resolution also highlighted the growing list of international treaties, 
which addressed specific ‘aspects of the problem of international terrorism.’13 The 
number of individual Conventions arguably reinforced the need for a more 
coordinated approach to be taken by the international community by emphasising that 
acts of terrorism were becoming an ever-growing issue. And, the list highlighted that 
attacks against transport modes was clearly becoming a ‘problem.’ Principally 
targeted were aviation and maritime – and response action included measures to 
counter such acts of sabotage, hostage-taking, hijacking and other related criminal 
exploits.  
 
The Resolution, in essence, highlighted that the international community was dis-
inherited in terms of a harmonised approach. It could also be viewed that measures 
                                                        
9 Resolution XXVII – 2114th plenary meeting, 18 December 1972. 
10 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 579 (1985) Adopted by the Security Council at its 
2637th Meeting, Para’s. 1 and 5; see also SC President Statement 8 October [online] 
http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNSCRsn/1985/ [accessed 26 December 2013, 27 April 2016].   
11 9 December 1994. 
12 As within the Annex at I.3. 
Also see discussion within S. J. Fox (2015) CONTEST’ing Chicago origins and reflections: lest we 
forget! Int. J. Private Law, Vol. 8, No.1, 2015 pp 73-98. 
13 ‘The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at 
Tokyo on 14 September 1963, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971, the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December 1973, the International Convention against 
the Taking of Hostages, adopted in New York on 17 December 1979, the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980,  the Protocol for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at 
Montreal on 24 February 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988, the Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 
10 March 1988, and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 
done at Montreal on 1 March 1991.’ 
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taken were largely responsive resulting in reactive Conventions, rather than proactive 
forethought. Up until this time no foresight had occurred in terms of attacks that could 
be coordinated or perpetrated through online or other growing technological 
advancements.   
 
However, in 1994, the General Assembly, at its 49th session, adopted Resolution 
49/158 (23 December 1994). This called for a strengthening of the United Nations 
crime prevention and criminal justice programme, particularly, recognising, the need 
to address technical cooperation capacity; and hence, 1994 also saw the United 
Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-related Crime.14  That 
said, the word ‘Internet’ was used only once in the Manual and the word ‘cybercrime’ 
was never used. However there was considerable foresight shown regarding the need 
for a more global joined-up approach in relation to ‘computer-related’ crime, which 
stated that there was a need for a more collaborative response from law enforcement 
bodies.  The Manual should therefore be regarded as giving an early alert concerning 
the abuse of the Internet by criminals. 
What could perhaps arguably never have been envisaged though was the growth in 
global electronic connectivity and the need to prioritise this strategy; or conversely, it 
could equally be said that this should have been anticipated and hence given a higher 
priority than actually transpired.  In 2014, the International Telecommunication 
Union, in Geneva, stated that there were then over 3 billion Internet users representing 
approximately 40 per cent of the global population – a growth four times higher than 
in 2009.15 
It was not until 2006 that the United Nations adopted its Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, in the form of a Resolution and an annexed Plan of Action.16 The 
Resolution, whilst reaffirming the need to strengthen the global fight against 
terrorism, made no direct mention to the aspect of cyber-terrorism – instead specific 
mention was given to the more traditionally perceived acts of terrorism, identifying in 
particular the concern of terrorist access to nuclear, chemical or radiological 
materials. 
However within section II of the Annex (‘Measures to prevent and combat terrorism,’ 
and the related Plan of Action) specific reference to the Internet and terrorism is 
made. In this regard the dilemma of the Internet, in terms of confidentiality and 
respecting human rights, and hence compliancy with other areas of international law, 
is referred to. This potentially strikes at the very difficulty in advancing cooperative 
plans involving the use of the Internet, not only from the perspective of data 
protection and human rights, but with regards to jurisdiction of a virtual entity.  
Specifically, whilst it is recognised that there is a need ‘to explore ways and means to: 
                                                        
14 United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-related Crime, International 
Review of Criminal Policy, Series M, Nos. 43-44 (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.94.IV.5.) 
Also see: United Nations Resolution on Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information Technologies 
GA RES 55/63, UNGA 55th Session, 81st Plenary Meeting UN Doc. A/RES/55/63 (2001).  
15 “The World in 2014: ICT facts and figures” (Geneva, 2014).  
16 A/RES/60/288 – September 2006. 
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a. coordinate efforts at the international and regional level to counter terrorism in all 
its forms and manifestations on the Internet, and: 
b. use the Internet as a tool for countering the spread of terrorism,’ it is also 
recognised ‘that States may require assistance in this regards.’ 
Further on, within this section, direct reference is made specifically to aviation, 
whereby, it is stated that there is a need ‘to encourage’ the UN Terrorism Committee 
and its Executive Directorate to continue to work with States and to ‘facilitate the 
adoption of legislation and administrative measures to implement the terrorist travel-
related obligations, and to identify best practices in this area, drawing….on… 
technical international organizations such as the International Civil Aviation 
Organization…..’ 
Inevitably there are several words to draw out for further scrutiny, particularly firstly, 
the use of, and reference to, the need to actually ‘encourage’ States to work together 
in a bid to achieving legislative measures.  Whilst there are issues to overcome (such 
as human rights, coordination and jurisdiction, etc.,) it undoubtedly remains in the 
International Community’s interests to work collaboratively to seek solutions so as to 
ensure the ‘quality of life of citizens [including] their freedom to travel.’17 
In this regard the emphasis (within the Strategy and Action Plan) remains arguably on 
the less contentious areas such as physical travel and risk and ‘identifying best 
practices.’ But, if these rather simplistic and established areas are recognised to still 
present such a challenge (in terms of coordinated action, which require 
encouragement and assistance) – it would have to be questioned how on earth can the 
aspect of achieving legislative measures to prevent, and means to strike back, at 
cyber-terrorism, perpetrated through cyberspace, ever be tackled….. and consensus 
achieved? 
Transport and particularly aviation and the related supporting infrastructure, have 
increasingly been targeted by terrorists,18 and it strikes at gross stupidity and 
ineptitude not to envisage a day when aviation will be targeted by a cyber-terrorist. 
Cybersecurity and cyber-terrorism are invariably the current challenges that need to 
be acknowledged and most importantly collectively reacted to by the international 
world.  
 
 
3. CONCERNS AND RISK: AVIATION CYBER-THREATS & ATTACKS 
 
The use of cyberspace is a relatively new tactic used by perpetrators to target 
computer systems - when this is without permission or authority it becomes a breach 
with various affects and consequences. Cybersecurity involves techniques, such as 
processes and practices, technology walls, etc., designed to add protection to networks 
and hence computers and programmes. 
                                                        
17 First quote in paper – see the lead-in, within the introduction.  COM(2011) 144 (final) ‘Roadmap to 
a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system.’ 
Brussels, 28.3.2011. 
18 For further discussions concerning aviation terrorism, see S. J. Fox (2015) CONTEST’ing Chicago 
origins and reflections: lest we forget! Int. J. Private Law, Vol. 8, No.1, 2015 pp 73-98. 
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It is recognised in general, that in cybersecurity terms, ‘risk’ is the potential for a 
‘threat’ – whereby it is recognised that there is a possible or probably danger or 
hazard, which is exploitable through the ‘vulnerability’ (a ‘flaw, feature or user 
error’) which may result in some negative consequence.19 A cyber-attack is when this 
has occurred and the risk has become a reality. The term ‘cyber-attack’ is to be 
understood as a range of malicious activities conducted through the use of 
information and communications technology. The attack can take various forms, such 
as ‘hacking’ (or arguably ‘cracking’) ‘jacking’ and ‘spoofing.’20 That said, there is an 
inherent lack of clarity and definition in respect to cyber-crimes much in the same 
way as arguably there still remains in terms of defining terrorism. 
 
During the past two years there have been an increase in the number of cyber-attacks 
aimed at aviation; and, in October, 2015, the director of the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) warned of the intensified possibility of a serious cyber-attack 
through hacking into the critical systems of an aircraft from the ground. In fact, the 
director, Mr Ky, openly revealed to the Association des Journalistes Professionnels de 
l'Aéronautique et de l'Espace (AJPAE) that his organisation had in fact hired someone 
to test the vulnerability of the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting 
System (ACARS) used to transmit messages between aircraft and ground stations.  It 
took the hacker, who was also a professional pilot, only five minutes to penetrate the 
messaging system and a further few days to then gain access to the aircraft control 
systems.  Hugo Teso has long warned over the possibility of hijacking a plane armed 
only with a mobile phone; and, has, therefore, stated that a cyber-attack, whereby a 
planes steering system is accessed, could easily lead to the crash of a plane.  
 
Perhaps it is little wonder that airlines and aircraft manufacturers have sought to play 
down such warnings.21 The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in 
2014, disputed the vulnerability of aircraft to direct cyber-attack, fervently 
proclaiming that, as the aircraft navigation and other control systems were effectively 
separated from non-critical systems such as entertainment that, the risk of hacking 
critical systems was actually low.22  However, even the categorising of a ‘low’ risk is 
arguably a risk that is worthy of being mitigated. The fact that experts23 have also 
pointed to the fact that the ACARS is outdated, having not been designed with 
cybersecurity in mind and hence remains vulnerable to attack, must be viewed as a 
risk threat - above that of low. This is supported by pilots who have also echoed their 
                                                        
19 Authors definition based upon UK Government document by the CESG The Information Security 
Arm of GCHQ ‘Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact.’ 
20 ‘Hacking’ is applied to a technical effort to manipulate the normal behaviour of network connections 
and systems which are connected.  Whilst it is often cited that malicious attacks on computer networks 
are officially known as cracking, as hacking is often applied to activities having good intentions. 
‘Jacking’ refers to the emission of radio signals aiming at disturbing the transceivers operations, 
‘Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing International Joint Conference’, SOCO’13-CISIS’13- 
ICEUTE’13, Springer, 2014.  
Whilst ‘spoofing’ refers to a faked/false sending address of a transmission to gain illegal unauthorized 
entry into a secure system, Cyber Security Glossary, http://niccs.us-cert.gov/  
21 A widely held view by cybersecurity analysis – see the ‘bizplus’ report, 02 October. 2015. 
22 Patrick Ky (Director of EASA speaking at the Association de Journalistes Profeeionnels de 
l’Aéronautique et de l’Espace (AJPAE) in 2015 making reference to an ICAO report the previous year 
(2014). See also < http://www.scmagazineuk.com/european-aviation-body-warns-of-cyber-attack-risk-
against-aircraft/article/444487/>  
23 Supra. FN. 21 & 23. 
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concerns about the growing risk to aircraft through various cyber methods.24 
Credence was also given to the increased severity of the actual ‘risk’ to aviation from 
cyber-attack (as opposed to purported claims and speculation) when, in 2015, United 
Airlines grounded all its flights in the US. This was due to concerns that spurious 
flight plans had appeared in its system.25 It was furthermore suggested that United 
Airlines customers’ data and records had also been the subject of illegal access.26 This 
concern was intensified further when the Polish airline, LOT, additionally reported a 
cyber-attack that affected their ground operation systems, which prevented them from 
developing flight plans.27 Whether these incidents could be said to have been terrorist 
motivated remains contestable but these attacks against airlines, and the supporting 
infrastructure, only too clearly reinforce the need to take cyber-crime seriously. 
Whilst cyber-crime can be directed and motivated for a number of reasons, and may 
range from external and internal threats where the purpose is aimed at blackmail, 
extortion, retribution, etc., or even just simply penetrating and testing the vulnerability 
of systems, the results can also be variable.  However, such breaches can inevitably 
compromise data, efficiency and ultimately safety.  
It should be acknowledged that telecommunications difficulties and infrastructure 
power problems are nothing new in terms of causing operational issues to air 
transport. As long ago as the 1990’s, for example, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) listed within a report, 114 major telecom outages in a 12-
month period (Neumann 1997). Whilst many of these issues may have been of a result 
of technological difficulties, the growing reliance on such communication 
advancements should have served as a clear warning of the vulnerabilities and 
possible threats in the future.  Arguably, this could be said to support the allegation 
that the authorities (such as international organisations and national bodies) have been 
too slow to react and respond, and hence be proactive and prepared against the 
growing risk that exists. Certainly the various governance systems have, for too long, 
been blind to the possibility, or arguably reluctant to acknowledge the increasing 
magnitude of the risk of cyber-attacks on the aviation industry. Whilst this may be 
changing of late, the degree of devastation and havoc that could result from a 
coordinated cyber-terrorist attack remains speculative – and is a subject rarely 
broached. It is certainly an area where no harmonised approach exists in order to 
respond to such. 
                                                        
24 See the report by The International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), Cyber 
threats: who controls your aircraft? 5 June, 2013. 
 http://www.ifalpa.org/store/14POS03%20-%20Cyber%20threats.pdf  [Accessed 30 April, 2015] 
25 Security Experts Warn Airlines Face Threat of Cyber Attacks,’ Sydney Morning Herald, July 6, 
2015.  
Also see, Jeffrey Dastin, ‘United Airlines awarded hackers millions of frequent flier miles for 
uncovering gaps in the company's cybersecurity.’ Reuters, Jul. 16, 2015. 
26  ‘China-Tied Hackers That Hit U.S. Said to Breach United Airlines’ Bloomsberg, July 29, 2015 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-29/china-tied-hackers-that-hit-u-s-said-to-breach-
united-airlines [Accessed 11 April, 2016] 
27 ‘Hackers successfully ground 1,400 passengers.’  CNN Politics, June, 22, 2015. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/22/politics/lot-polish-airlines-hackers-ground-planes/ [Accessed 11 
April, 2016]. 
Also see other headlines - ‘Polish Airline, Hit By Cyber Attack, Says All Carriers Are At Risk’, 
Reuters, June 22, 2015, Warsaw/Frankfurt  
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Today’s increased number of traffic movements warrants the need for advanced 
computer-based systems in almost every aspect of civil aviation operations such as air 
navigation systems, on-board aircraft control and communications systems, airport 
ground systems, day-to-day management and booking systems etc. Each element 
remains vulnerable, and whilst cyber-attacks can take many forms, including isolated 
computer viruses, or more concerted and directed attacks that can cause both safety 
and security concerns, it is the coordinated actions of terrorist groups which seek to 
undertake a series of attacks levied against various systems simultaneously which has 
to be of the utmost concern.  
Perhaps one of the most damning acknowledgements of the actual threat, and, the 
state of unpreparedness was the United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) Report to Congressional Requesters in 2015.28 This related specifically to the 
responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to the national airspace 
system (NAS)29 but nevertheless revealed serious vulnerability in this respect, one 
that is undoubtedly replicated throughout the complex and various computer networks 
that support air transport. This report found that whilst the FAA had taken some steps 
to protect its air traffic control systems from cyber-attack it had, nonetheless, not fully 
implement its agency-wide information security program, a requirement of the 
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.30   
Identified failures included: 
- ‘Not always sufficiently test security controls to determine that they were 
operating as intended;’  
- Not resolving identified ‘security weaknesses in a timely fashion; or complete 
or adequately test plans for restoring system operations in the event of a 
disruption or disaster.’  
Furthermore, it was also identified that the group responsible for incident detection 
and response for NAS had ‘insufficient access to security logs or network sensors on 
the operational network, limiting FAA’s ability to detect and respond to security 
incidents affecting its mission-critical systems.’31 
The report showed alarming shortcomings and an unacceptable risk to air transport, 
which the FAA clearly acknowledged. The report made 17 recommendations relating 
to the information security programme and the need to establish an integrated 
management approach to security risk. And, a separate report, with limited public 
access, made a further 168 specific actions to address further weaknesses.  The fact 
that these risks remain unexposed to the public could be seen as a blessing on the one 
hand – one that prevents the identified risks being acted upon by the criminally 
                                                        
28 GAO, ‘FAA Needs to Address Weaknesses in Air Traffic Control Systems.’ Jan, 2015.  
29 To contextualise the actual scope the FAA concludes that this relates to ‘more than 19,000 airports, 
nearly 600 air traffic control facilities, and approximately 65,000 other facilities, including radar, 
communications nodes, ground-based navigation aids, computer displays, and radios, intended to 
provide safe and efficient flight services for the public. Over 46,000 FAA personnel and approximately 
608,000 pilots operate about 228,000 aircraft within the NAS, including up to 2,850 flights at any 
given moment.’  
Operational use is on a continuous basis, 24 hours a day, and every day of the year.  
30 Pursuant to Title III of the E-government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347).  
31 GAO, ‘FAA Needs to Address Weaknesses in Air Traffic Control Systems.’ Jan, 2015. 
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minded; or, a concern on the other hand - risks that are unknown but whereby the 
travelling public remain oblivious to the actual vulnerability that still surrounds their 
flights. 
Whilst the older systems rely on point-to-point communications, NAS systems, and 
particularly the NextGen (US) systems, increasingly use IP technologies to 
communicate over interconnected computer networks. With this new technology 
arguably the threat and potential risk of attack intensifies, as it is recognised that 
integrated critical infrastructure systems with information technology networks 
provides ‘significantly’ less isolation from the outside world than the more dated 
systems.  This message is replicated in Europe, where it has long been advocated that 
the newer, next generation of air traffic management systems, such as the Single 
European Sky ATM Research (SESAR), requires further protection. The modern, 
next generation aircraft, like the Boeing 787 Dreamliner and Airbus A350 and A380, 
also face the same challenges – that is, susceptibility to cyber-sabotage.32 Clearly 
these identified concerns demand the need to secure all these systems from remote, 
external threats, whereby preventative action against proven, known and perceived 
vulnerabilities is taken.  
 
Safeguarding computer systems that are part of not only a nation’s but invariably 
growing global infrastructure systems remains critical.  And whilst the GAO report 
was specific to the US, the message is clear across the globe – ‘aviation is and 
remains vulnerable to cyber-attack!’  A cyber-terrorism attack will undoubtedly be 
coordinated and hence the industry and regulators need to equally be coordinated and 
furthermore prepared! 
 
4. REACTION AND MITIGATION – STRATEGIES 
President Clinton clearly recognised this threat over 20 years ago, and, in 1996, 
formed a Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which later published a 
report (1997) summarising the findings. In this it was stated, 
‘A personal computer and a simple telephone connection to an Internet 
service provider anywhere in the world are enough to cause a great deal of 
harm.’ And the report warned, ‘[t]he right command sent over a network to a 
power generating station's control computer could be just as effective as a 
backpack full of explosives, and the perpetrator would be harder to identify 
and apprehend.’33 
 
In 1999 President Clinton identified that, 
 ‘open borders and revolutions in technology have spread the message and the 
gifts of freedom, but have also given new opportunities to freedom’s enemies... 
                                                        
32 Ibid. 
33 The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting 
America's Infrastructures 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/cip/resources/pccip/report_index.html [Accessed 5 May, 2016] 
  12 
we must be ready...ready if our adversaries try to use computers to disable 
power grids, banking, communications and transportation networks...’34  
Nearly some 15-years on, President Barack Obama again addressed these matters in 
his State of the Union Address (2013) specifically this time identifying the 
vulnerabilities to the air traffic control systems, saying, 
 ‘America must face the rapidly growing threat from cyber-attacks…… 
our enemies are also seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our 
financial institutions, our air traffic control systems. 
We cannot look back years from now and wonder why we did nothing in the 
face of real threats to our security and our economy.’ 
 
Whilst this may show acceptance of the risks and hence good intention to address the 
situation, when this is not acted upon it surely must be deemed a negligent failure.  
The GAO Report coming some two-year later, contentiously perhaps, clearly showed 
this to be the case.  
 
In 2012 the UK produced a report identifying the need for a general approach to 
cybersecurity for civil aviation.35  Within it, it was advocated that this should be a 
two-pronged approach (i) ‘bottom-up’ through technology36 and (ii) ‘top-down’ from 
a coordinated control system. 
 
In this regard it was identified that the top of aviation should be deemed to be the UN 
specialised agency, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) – however, 
it should be commented on (as earlier stated) that as late as 2014, ICAO were 
criticised by the EASA for adopting an approach which played down the risk to 
aviation. Perhaps then, it should come as little surprise that in 2016 (to date) the 
progress has been slow and arguably globally inadequate in formulating a suitable 
international framework. In essence, achieving consensus amongst the current 191 
ICAO member nations has often provided difficult.  Even after more ‘traditional’ 
perpetrated terrorist attacks, where utterings of good intention were initially made, the 
resolve to commit to action has been slow. Inherently, there are protracted 
deliberations, which do not serve as quick way to provide a rapid means to address 
critical issues.  
 
In 2014, Fox wrote ‘[t]he events of 9/11 were arguably the most high profile tragedy 
to highlight that when things go wrong, the cost can be enormous, both in terms of 
loss of life and the respective financial consequences’ (Fox 2014b). She advocated 
that a framework was needed to deal with the aftermath of such. The framework 
should also be proactive and preventative - from anticipating the future vulnerability 
through to serving as a means to mitigate for such future atrocities. Fox stated that the 
                                                        
34 Speech to the National Academy of Sciences. Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century. Proc 
Natl Acad Sci U S A. 1999 Mar 30; 96(7): 3486–3488.  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC34291/ [Accessed 15 May, 2016] 
35  CPNI - ‘Cyber Security in Civil Aviation’ (Centre for the Protection of the Critical Infrastructure) 
August 2012. 
36 In this regard, it should be noted that this paper concerns the legislative and regulatory 
framework.  
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international community, after Lockerbie,37 should have been prepared for such an 
event as 9/11, with a pre-indicator having perhaps been provided by the hijacking of 
the Air France Flight 8969.38  The reasoning for hijacking this plane was allegedly 
based upon the intention to blow the plane up over Paris, or to crash it into the Eiffel 
Tower in Paris (Fox 2014b). In this respect, it could be construed that aviation has not 
learnt from past events and anticipated effectively mitigating against future risks, 
albeit from a cyber perspective – of cyber-attacks and specifically cyber-terrorism.  
Ultimately, it has not shown the drive needed to be prepared and internationally 
coordinated.  
 
4.1. Cybersecurity - governance 
Whilst there is clear ‘pointing’ to the fact that direction needs to come from ICAO in 
terms of protection against aviation related cyber-attacks, arguably this is a far more 
extensive and complicated matter, extending past the realms of aviation into general 
governance for cybersecurity. 
 
It is really only over a short period, of some 20-years, that a series of UN General 
Assembly Resolutions relating to cyber-security have been adopted. The UN has 
therefore only relatively recently recognised the need for international experts to 
come together in order to build ‘cooperation for a peaceful, secure, resilient and open 
ICT environment’ by agreeing upon ‘norms, rules and principles of responsible 
behaviour by States’ and identifying confidence and capacity-building measures, 
including for the exchange of information.39 The report from the group of experts 
identifies that ‘international law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, 
is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an 
open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment.’ Although the report points to 
the fact that countries recognise the need for ‘full applicability of international law to 
state behaviour in cyberspace,’ experts have labelled it only as ‘a landmark step 
toward universal acceptance of the legal framework.’40 In essence the report is one of 
intention rather than that of asserted action. This is perhaps reinforced by the report 
itself, which added a note of caution in terms of identifying that there remains a 
common lack of understanding as to how these norms should apply. And, hence there 
is no common consensus as to how this is to be achieved, with the experts, also 
stressing that further study is ultimately needed in this respect before any leaps 
forward are possible. 
 
Consequently, at the present time there remains no international, legally binding 
instruments to regulate inter-state relations in cyberspace. Whilst pocketed action 
maybe being taken, by isolated States and regions that recognise the obvious and 
                                                        
37 The bombing of Pan American flight (Pan-Am) 103 over Lockerbie in 1988. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See the Sixty-eighth session, ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in 
the context of international security.’ 24 June, 2013. A Report from the Group of Governmental 
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security.  
 The Group was established pursuant to paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution  A/RES/66/24, 
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international 
security. 
40 Wolter, Detlev. “The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity”, Arms Control Today, 43, 
September 2013, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-on-
Cybersecurity [Accessed 30 April 2016] 
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‘certain’ threats of cyber-attack, this is leading to a patch-work approach of national 
laws and reasoning.  For example, such initiatives have included the African Union 
Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection; the Agreement on 
cooperation among the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
in combating offences related to computer information; the (2001) Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime41; Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, on attacks against information systems; the League of Arab States 
Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences; and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of International 
Information Security, etc. 
 
Whilst 2015 saw some agreements on Internet Governance, these were made under 
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on the WSIS 10+ Outcomes Document;42 and, 
hence, the ‘agreements,’ remain an understanding in principle, rather than affective 
assertive and collaborative action. The UNGA Resolutions have no binding effect and 
are as much as anything aimed at confidence building rather than serving as a 
definitive and ultimately effective means of governance and solution.  
The difficulty in terms of effective governance and consensus, debatably, centres a 
round two aspects (1) the conflict of security vs. human rights; and, (2) the very fact 
that cyberspace remains a contestable area, specifically in terms of trust and 
ownership.  The latter two aspects, that of trust and ownership, acutely are 
comparable to the very issues that concern aviation and the related legacy of 
sovereign control and political ‘will,’ or apathy, which invariably have stood to 
prevent liberalisation and fairness of competition equally across the globe (Fox 
2014a, b; Fox 2016). 
Like aviation (air services), there remains stark political differences largely related to 
the economic interests of governments, as well as corporate entities, to contend with, 
and factor in, when discussing Internet governance, and hence cyber protection 
against attacks. Determining boundaries for each respective party, let alone country 
jurisdiction, remains controversial. Whilst some boundaries have remained less 
contentious, with the EU clearly showing the possibility to create a borderless trading 
zone, (internally at least) the same cannot be said of airspace (Fox, 2016). Equally and 
comparatively, whilst the sky above us has no discernable-physical boundaries, it is 
acutely recognised as a State asset. Hence, the airspace above a State has remained a 
key sovereign right, which is closely safeguarded and inevitably protected (Fox, 
2016). For all intents and purpose the same ethos has arguably been adopted in terms 
of cyberspace. However, reference to cyberspace largely remains outside the scope of 
most instruments and whilst physical space and airspace above States are recognised 
by law, international law remains wholly inadequate in offering the protection and 
definition needed in terms of boundaries and border re cyberspace control and 
governance.   
                                                        
41 Convention on Cybercrime ETS 185 – Convention on Cybercrime, 23.XI.2001 (Budapest).  
42 For example A/RES/70/125 (17th Session) Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 
December 2015 in relation to the Outcome document of the high-level meeting of the General 
Assembly on the overall review of the implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the 
Information Society.  
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The word ‘cyber-terrorism’ maybe set to increase within our everyday vocabulary and 
ultimately reference; but the very definition and understanding of such will no doubt 
remain debated and contested (much in the same way as ‘terrorism’ is43). The USA 
PATRIOT Act 18 U.S.C. 2332b’s referred to ‘acts of terrorism transcending national 
boundaries’ and made reference to some activities and damage defined in the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFA) 18 U.S.C. 1030a-c. That said, it has also been 
interpreted that the later Act concerns a criminal act rather than an act of terrorism.  
Without much needed clarity in these matters, there invariably remains uncertainty 
and the raising of issues and questions, in respect to offences in cyberspace, responses 
and jurisdiction issues. A question of concern would be whether a war could be 
declared after a cyber-terrorist attack? (Much in the same way as the US contentiously 
applied ‘the war on terror’ philosophy and rationale after 9/11.) 
Prior to the 2013 report by international experts,44 the US State Department, in 2012 
had already made clear reference to its interpretation and the fact that cyber activities 
could constitute a use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary 
international law. According to, Harold Koh, the then-legal advisor, ‘[c]yber activities 
that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be 
viewed as a use of force.’45 And hence, the right to self-defence could also be 
applicable under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.  
A US Congressional Research Service document stated that ‘cyberterrorists are state-
sponsored and non-state actors who engage in cyberattacks to pursue their objectives;’ 
whilst furthermore adding that ‘cyberwar46 is typically conceptualized as state-on-
state action equivalent to an armed attack or use of force in cyberspace that may 
trigger a military response with a proportional kinetic use of force.’47 Whilst 
presenting very powerful terminology, the reality is that a cyber-attack could easily 
result in retaliation of further cyber-attacks or physical reaction, which could see an 
escalation of global conflict. 
This remains a real danger and one where concerted action needs to be agreed now, 
before such a serious attack actually occurs and peace is threatened. The US 
Congressional Report also questioned territorial boundaries and what constitutes an 
armed attack in cyberspace, making reference to the so-called “Law of War,” (also 
known as the law of armed conflict, embodied in the Geneva and Hague Conventions 
and the U.N. Charter) offering substantiation to the fact that (in some circumstances) 
                                                        
43 The legal analysis, Baldor, offered that cyber-terrorism is the ‘premeditated use of disruptive 
activities, or the threat thereof, against computers and/or networks, with the intention to cause harm or 
further social, ideological, religious, political or similar objectives, or to intimidate any person in 
furtherance of such objectives.’ 
 Lolita Baldor, “Cyber Security Added to US-Australia Treaty,” Security on NBCNews.com, 2011, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44527648/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/cyber-security-added-
us-australia- treaty/ [Accessed 12 April 2016]. 
44 Supra. FN 39. 
45 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State, speaking at a USCYBERCOM Inter-
Agency Legal Conference, Ft. Meade, MD, 18, September 2012.  
46 Like cyber-terrorism there remains no clear definition or understanding as to what constitutes 
cyberwar/cyberwarfare. 
47 Catherine A. Theohary and John W. Rollins. ‘Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism: In Brief.  
Congressional Research Service. 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43955. 27 March, 2015.  
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cyber-attacks, may indeed come within the remit of typically perceived means of 
warfare. However, the true significance and understanding of its applicability, and 
therefore the response of nations, remains unclear. For as stated earlier, cyberspace is 
complicated by the use of remote computers, and retaliation through using such 
remains highly contentious (but unfortunately foreseeable) particularly when 
reviewed in terms of the possible harm to third parties from cyber counterattacks. In 
addition, the Report also raised the issue of territorial boundaries, and what 
constitutes an armed attack in cyberspace.   
There is every reason to believe that terrorism will eventually take a sinister cyber 
turn, whereby vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, including within aviation, are 
targeted. And, inevitably such an attack will invariably test other vulnerabilities that 
exist, not only in terms of the targeted area but also the lack of understanding and 
governance for such.  This includes the lack of an overarching framework, of 
agreements, of action and for response. 
In 2011 NATO established the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
(CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia, which, whilst having honourable intentions, also 
reinforced the current situation in terms of the lack of a coordinated mechanism. The 
workshops held, stress the need to be ethical in cyberspace, but this remains a point 
that will no doubt be missed by the cyber-terrorist.  In 2013 the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare was produced. The Tallinn Manual 
reinforces the global disparity - in the main part, by relating to the jus ad bellum, the 
international law governing the resort to force by States as an instrument of their 
national policy, and the jus in bello, the international law regulating the conduct of 
armed conflict. However, the manual remains only the expression of scholarly 
opinions of a group of independent experts. Nonetheless, it draws attention to the 
conflict between international law and national law, and States’ acceptance as to the 
best way to proceed when such contentious matters arise concerning cyberspace. 
Inevitably, there remains a conflict between openness vs. protection. On the one hand, 
digital and information technology facilitates transnational dialogue, facilitating the 
global flow of goods, people and services. On the other hand, it is recognised that 
there is a need to protect (internally) what is perceived as critical national life-
sustaining infrastructures, such as electricity and water. However, due to globalisation 
and increased connectivity, this has become even more complicated by adding a 
transnational dimension to systems such as air traffic control, which depend on 
networked information systems, that, in many cases, now extend past national 
boundaries.   
This has created a complex, interconnected and layered dimension. Arguably, the 
underlying infrastructure that must be protected is the digital enabler of the other 
critical infrastructures (previously mentioned).  Hence, for all nations, the digital 
infrastructure is increasingly being seen as a key asset - albeit with an increasing 
international dimension.  Aviation, from this perspective, could therefore be viewed 
as a valuable substructure – which equally needs protecting.   
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5. PROTECTING AVIATION – coming full-circle 
 
Aviation and air travel remains a social and economic enabler of international trade, 
tourism and everyday living.  It is mechanism of survival to many. Whilst air travel is 
recognised as one of the safest forms of transport,48 it equally relies on a safe and 
efficient network to support it.  Disruption to these movements would invariably lead 
to a ripple affect across the globe, much as happened in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, where aircraft were used as a means to carry out terrorist atrocities. 
 
ICAO, as a specialised agency of the UN, cites that its current objectives are strongly 
linked to 13 of the 17 UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), stating that the 
Organisation is fully committed to work in close cooperation with States and other 
UN Bodies to support related targets.  But a risk to obtaining these targets remain 
modern day challenges that compromise safety and security; and, ICAO lists both 
safety and security (and facilitation of security) in respect to aviation as two of its key 
objectives.49 Cybersecurity breaches are inevitably a major cause for concern, and 
given the history of terrorist-attacks against aviation, aviation has to be viewed as 
highly vulnerable to the risk of cyber-terrorism.  
 
The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation50 (also known as the Chicago 
Convention) is a constituent instrument of ICAO.  The Preamble to the Convention 
states the reasoning of the contracting parties for formulating the agreement and 
summarises the aims and objectives of ICAO (as per Article 44) recognising that, 
 
‘WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation can greatly 
help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations 
and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general 
security;’51 
 
In reality, this 1944 agreement related to the concept of general security and 
perceived risks relating to that era.52 The likelihood of hijackings, seizures and other 
terrorist events, were arguably not predictable at that time, or at least not to the rate 
that has transpired and has to date been experienced. And it is said, with almost 
certainty, that the founders would never have foreseen the risks from cyberspace.53 
 
Today, there maybe some common vision as to the risk from cyber-attacks, but 
arguably there is no firm strategy. A framework has still not been sufficiently 
developed that is pro-active or reactive, as it may need to be for the future, and the 
aspect of jurisdiction and response are clearly missing.  In December 2014, ironically 
some 70-years since the Convention, whilst ICAO acknowledged this risk, it was 
                                                        
48 See amongst other sources: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/safety/index_en.htm [Accessed 
12 April, 2016] 
49 The others being: air navigation capacity and efficiency, environmental protection and the economic 
development of air transport. 
50 Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944) Doc. 7300.  (Also known as the Chicago 
Convention) 
51 Emphasis added. 
52 See further discussions within, S. Fox (2014) ‘The evolution of aviation in times of war and peace: 
blood, tears, and salvation’, International Journal on World Peace, December, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp.49–
79.  
53 Ibid. 
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somewhat underplayed, when it was stated that the ‘global aviation system [is] 
potentially vulnerable to attacks from hackers and other cyber criminals.’54  The 
declaration was made by five major key stakeholder and players coming together 
(ICAO, the Airports Council International (ACI), the Civil Air Navigation Services 
Organisation (CANSO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the 
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industry Associations (ICCAIA)) 
and agreeing on a common roadmap to align their respective actions on cyber threats. 
Although, this must be viewed as a progressive step in the right direction, it is 
arguably one that is very late in coming and certainly cannot be seen as a significant 
leap. Again it is an intention rather than a decisive measure; although, that said, it is 
firmly stated that the aim is to be ‘more proactive in sharing critical information such 
as threat identification, risk assessments and cybersecurity best practices.’55 
Invariably, such statements serves only to reinforce and identify that there has not 
been a sufficiently proactive stance of preventative measures taken to date. However, 
perhaps worryingly, with the emphasis on ‘encouraging more substantial coordination 
at the State level between their respective government and industry stakeholders on all 
cybersecurity strategies, policies, and plans,’56 there is clear recognition that there is 
not only a lack of governance internationally but at a national, State level too.  
 
The emphasis should be on ensuring coordination and cooperation as a means to 
prevent cyber-attack and cyber-terrorism. In essence the assertion is merely the 
aspirations for a common goal, ‘to work more effectively together to establish and 
promote a robust cybersecurity culture and strategy for the benefit of all actors in 
[the] industry.’57 In other words, there remain no firm underlining enforceable 
strategy, which includes, standards, and policies. The roadmap does not provide the 
means to prevent, detect, respond and ultimately recover in the face of a cyber-attack 
and cyber-terrorism. 
At the 2015 Conference on Civil Aviation Cyber Security58 the Secretary General of 
ICAO, Raymond Benjamin, stated, that there had been, ‘no catastrophic cyber 
security event has been reported to ICAO to this point in time,’ which perhaps 
intimated at the real level of threat to aviation. Such uttering further identifies, that, to 
date, the world could consider itself fortunate not to have experienced the devastating 
of cyber-terrorism against an aircraft and/or the supporting infrastructure. 
Whilst the 2014 agreement was based upon formalising common responses against 
‘hackers,’ ‘hacktivists,’ ‘cyber criminals’ and ‘terrorists’ who have general ‘malicious 
intent ranging from the theft of information and general disruption to potential loss of 
life,’59 Benjamin acknowledged that ICAO Aviation Security Panel’s Working Group 
on Threat and Risk had only recently expanded the scope of its analytical work to 
include cyber threats. This being part of its continuous review of risks facing civil 
aviation security, and hence impacting its recommendations for updating the ICAO 
Global Risk Context Statement.  
                                                        
54  Emphasis added. ‘Aviation unites on cyber threat.’ MONTRÉAL, 10 December 2014. 
55 Ibid. http://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/aviation-unites-on-cyber-threat.aspx [Accessed 30 April, 
2016] 
56 Emphasis added. 
57 Supra. 54 & 55. 
58 Singapore, 9-10 July 2015.  
59 Emphasis added. ‘Aviation unites on cyber threat.’ MONTRÉAL, 10 December 2014. 
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It should be commented upon, that it was only in 2011 that a provision on measures, 
relating to cyber threats, was introduced by ICAO into Annex 17 to the Chicago 
Convention,60 and in this respect, it should be further noted that this relates in the 
main to Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP’s) – wherein it was 
specifically recommended that States should develop measures to protect information 
and communications technology systems used for civil aviation from interference that 
may endanger the safety of our network.  
The fact that ICAO’s AVSEC Panel’s Working Group, is currently considering a 
number of key initiatives seeking to identify and assess possible cyber-attacks points 
again only serves to indicate how unprepared the industry has been and arguably 
remains. This process includes scenarios relating to the aircraft cockpit, cabin and 
maintenance systems, the inter-related information and communications technologies 
(ICTs) which support modern air traffic management (ATM) capabilities, and airport-
based systems for requirements such as departure control and flight information 
display.  
In 2014-15 new guidance material on cyber threats to critical aviation ICT systems 
was introduced within the ICAO Aviation Security Manual,61 with the First Edition of 
the ICAO Air Traffic Management Security Manual providing further technical 
guidance.62  
However ICAO clearly acknowledges that cybersecurity remains a challenge for 
many industries and that there are difficulties in ensuring the means to coordinate and 
achieve a consensus approach, which habitually remains a challenge from a 
governance perspective. ICAO acknowledges that Member States continue to take 
isolated action, which does not always involve the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) of 
the Member State; and, hence, ICAO is currently assembling Member States own 
framework and guidance documents into a series of reference materials to provide 
support to the 191 ICAO Member States.  This, in essence, reinforces the point that 
the risk extends beyond aviation and hence involves a multitude of stakeholders and 
supporting agencies that actually need to be also involved in cybersecurity through a 
multi-layered framework approach. 
5.1. Future needs: tomorrow will become today 
In 2013 the (US) FBI Director said, 
‘I do not think today it [cyber] is necessarily the number one threat, but it will 
be tomorrow. Counterterrorism and stopping terrorist attacks, for the FBI, is 
a present number one priority. But down the road, the cyber threat, which cuts 
across all programs, will be the number one threat to the country.’63 
Whilst in 2013 cyber threats may not have been the number one concern – inevitably, 
tomorrow will become today. 
                                                        
60 Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944) Doc. 7300. 
61 Doc 8973 - restricted 
62 Doc 9985 – restricted.   
63 Department of Defense – Defense Science Board (DBS), Task Force on Resilient Military Systems 
and the Advanced Cyber.’ January, 2013 
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Statistics confirm that there was an alarming increase of 38% of recorded cyberweb-
based attacks in the EU and around the world during 2015. Whilst these are not 
specifically cyber-terrorist related, it does, nevertheless, show the increase of threat 
level to that perceived in 2013.64 
In 2012 the CPNI in consultation with the Joint Coordination Group (JCG) strongly 
advocated that cybersecurity should be part of all civil aviation considerations. Whilst 
aviation has achieved an unprecedented level of safety, it is acknowledged that in 
respect to facing new security threats, ‘the global aviation system is at a crossroads.’65 
Although ICAO has been working on security SARP’s for a number of years in 
relation to the Air Traffic Networks (ATN), cybersecurity aspects are relatively new. 
Inevitably, there are many remaining challenges for ICAO to overcome in terms of 
governance before coordinated action can be taken by all contracting States. For 
example, one governance perspective relates to the complicated inter relationship of 
the States that are not only Members to the Chicago Convention but to many other 
Conventions and agreements. Invariably this can lead to conflicts and jurisdiction 
issues. Taking the Internet as a starting point, it can be seen that the Internet crosses 
over into the realms of various international bodies, such as the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN).  Hence, there remains a conflict in respect to Member States decisions in 
terms of telecommunications systems passing through their territories and related 
areas such as security per se and aviation/security matters.  
5.1.1. Lessons from Europe 
In terms of aviation, Europe has shown perhaps a more coordinated approach 
particularly through the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) which is an 
inter-governmental organisation of not only EU States but other Member Countries.  
Currently there are 44 members. The aim is to harmonise civil aviation policies and 
practices amongst its Member States and to promote policy understanding. Security is 
one of the three strategic priorities of ECAC, and, ECAC has investigated cyber 
threats to aviation being pro-active in producing a handbook on aviation security with 
a chapter (chapter IV) dedicated to the aspect of cybersecurity. The idea of a 
European air transport body was first envisaged in 1951, when the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe considered made the proposal aimed at achieving 
the greatest possible degree of co-ordination in inter-European air transport.  The 
origins and formulation involved close liaison with ICAO and at the end of 1955 
ECAC held its inaugural session in Strasbourg. ECAC in many ways could be viewed 
as an aviation ‘think-tank’ providing an opportunity for discussion but nevertheless 
without binding implications. That said, the suggestions feed into the European Union 
(including EASA) and EUROCONTROL. But it should here again be noted that it is 
only since 2002 that the EU Commission has established common rules in the field of 
civil aviation security aimed at protecting persons and goods from unlawful 
interference with civil aircraft. 
                                                        
64 EU data: Digital Single Market: Cybersecurity & Privacy – (last updated on 11/04/2016 - 17:01) 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/cybersecurity-privacy [Accessed 1 May, 2016] 
65 AIAA Decision Paper, ‘A Framework for Aviation Cybersecurity.’ August 2013 
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On 27 September 2011 the European Commission hosted a high level conference on 
security. The timing was perhaps apt, given that it came in the wake of the ten-years 
anniversary of the terrorist attacks of 11 September in 2001 in the United States. 
The purpose was said to discuss the ‘future’ of civil aviation security but it should be 
noted that arguably more reference was given to the past decade, rather than 
appreciating the true significance of future threats. In particular, the following were 
discussed: 
(i) What lessons were learnt from incidents in the past few years? 
(ii) What further measures could be taken on an international level to improve 
risk assessment and resilience to terrorist attacks?  
(iii) Should the move be to a more risk based approach to security controls in 
passenger and cargo traffic? 
(iv) How can common platform of sharing and use of available information be 
developed? 
(v) How can better use be made of existing tools and mechanisms in counter-
terrorism and customs for the purpose of civil aviation security? 
(vi) How successful has the work on a European Union common risk 
assessment method been so far? 
(vii) Is today's model of aviation security controls sustainable in the long 
term? 
(viii) How can the security measures be implemented adequately relative to 
the threat assessment results with minimum impact on travel and commerce, 
especially between high-security countries? (Does facilitation have to be at the 
expense of security?) 
(ix) Should further consideration be given to more unpredictable 
controls/more differentiated controls based on risk? How should the 
improvement be made in terms of the approach to developing security 
technologies in the EU? 
The conclusion of the Conference66 was that since 9/11 ‘civil aviation ‘is’ protected 
by a robust security regime and that the extensive controls in place combined with 
continued strong intelligence attention have been instrumental in foiling attempts at 
unlawful interference.’ The reference to ‘is’ may be applicable to the normally 
perceived risk of terrorism and unlawful interference based upon passed events – but 
arguably not to cyber-terrorism which the FBI have openly acknowledged is 
tomorrow’s real threat (and hence is arguably now today’s). 
Statistically it is said, ‘the security threat posed to aviation remains relatively small.’67 
That said, arguably this fails to take into account the relative ease of a cyber-attack 
and the remoteness of a terrorist attack – for which no key statistics are known. 
However, if key evidence is analysed the potential for a terrorist attack based upon the 
arguable ease of a cyber breach are enormous. 
                                                        
66 High Level Conference ‘Protecting Civil Aviation Against Terrorists.’ Brussels, 27 September 2011 
 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/events/doc/2011-09-27-avsec-conclusions.pdf [Accessed 1 
May, 2016] 
67 Ibid. 
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The following two reported ‘real’ examples provided serve merely to provide a 
scenario of the risk of a terrorist attack based upon a cyber breach and a follow-on 
physical terrorist attack: 
(1) ‘A recent Freedom of Information request revealed that the DVLA has 
been subjected to 264,484 attempted cyberattacks in the past three years, 
equating to more than 200 a day. Almost 6,000 incidents have been classed as 
structured query (SQL) attacks. Attacks such as SQLi (SQL Injection) are 
extremely frequently used by cyber criminals to insert malicious code to 
exploit computers.’68 
(2) On 28 April, 2016 it was reported that, ‘Hackers target Goldcorp Inc, [and] 
release reams of private data online including payroll and passports.’69 
Although the attack was aimed at one of Canada's largest mining companies, it 
highlights the fact that whilst such companies remain at risk, copious amount 
of private details on individuals are available from various sources. 
Whilst arguably these two unrelated events relate to ‘remote’ access to computer held 
records, and range from malicious to a criminal intent (exploitation – blackmail) there 
are obvious lessons to aviation in terms of related risks.  
 For example, passports and driving licences are now linked-records in the UK; 
so, any breach to the DVLA’s computer systems (the Driver and Vehicle 
Licence Authority in the UK) should be seen as of high concern. The 
possibility of gaining access to either of these documents (a driving licence or 
a passport) potentially could lead to terrorists physically gaining access to an 
aircraft, by distorting information held so as to make the passport appear 
genuine or through the copying and replication of a true passport. In either 
case this would mean that a person would be more unlikely to be challenged 
before boarding an aircraft. 
Biometric information, which is now a key feature of a passport is itself an electronic 
constituent and therefore is subject to illegal access and manipulation. The passport, 
containing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips, supposedly introduced for 
purposes of increased security, is also said to be vulnerable and easy to access.70  
Although UK passports purport to use a strong crypto algorithm to protect their 
biometric data, the encryption key apparently is easy to steal. As the ICAO's website 
acknowledges, the key consists of the passport number, the holder’s date of birth and 
the expiration date of the passport, which all are valuable information to a terrorist. 
                                                        
68 https://threatintelligencetimes.com/tag/dvla-hacked/ [Accessed 1 May, 2016] 
69 http://business.financialpost.com/news/mining/goldcorp-inc-confirms-it-was-hacked-begins-
investigation-to-determine-full-scope-of-breach [Accessed 1 May, 2016] 
70 ‘A report in the British newspaper The Guardian found the passports surprisingly easy to read and 
copy. Using a device purchased for £250, a Guardian reporter was able to view and copy information 
from several of the new passports’: see https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2006/11/british-rfid-passports-
easily-hacked referring to: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2006/nov/17/news.homeaffairs [Accessed 1 May, 2016] 
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However, potentially a more alarming variable of a cyber-attack can be seen based 
upon another mode of transport – the automobile, and the fact that in 2015 Fiat 
Chrysler was forced to issue what was said to be a ‘safety recall affecting 1.4m 
vehicles in the US’ after security researchers showed that one of its cars could be 
hacked.71 
The relative ease in penetrating a vehicle could easily translate to aviation and various 
related systems; and, whilst it potentially is of little benefit to a terrorist to target 
individual motor vehicles the same could not be advocated of an aircraft. 
As was said at the conclusion of the 2011 European Commission on security,72 
… ‘aviation is a symbol of international trade, freedom, and 
entrepreneurship. The public is highly risk averse when aviation is concerned, 
and creating a climate of fear and suspicion is part of the terrorist game-plan. 
Attackers may target not only loss of life but also disruption of business 
operations. That makes aviation an attractive target to international 
terrorism.’  
Debatably, the travelling public remain oblivious to the real risks that exist when they 
fly, and arguably, this has to date, not been exploited by a terrorist.  Whilst the 
ultimate findings were that there is still more to be done, little acknowledgement was 
specifically made to the area of cybersecurity. 
However, Europe has shown ‘preparedness’ in terms of a response and crisis 
management approach in the event of a cyber-attack (and hence cyber-terrorism).  
Whilst this may not be aimed at preventative measures, the European Aviation Crisis 
Coordination Cell - EACCC73 is actively engaged in ensuring an improved level of 
preparedness in Europe for any kind of crisis potentially having an impact on air 
traffic. In the main this is aimed at safety factors, however security incidents 
(terrorism) are also stated, which includes the possibility of massive cyber-attacks. 
From a EU perspective securing network and information systems is viewed as 
essential to ensuring prosperity and to keeping the online economy running. In 2013 
the Commission put forward a proposal for a Directive concerning measures to ensure 
a high common level of network and information security across the Union. Whilst it 
has taken some time for the Parliament and Council to agree on the text of the 
Network and Information Security Directive (NIS)74 it will nevertheless serve as a 
                                                        
71 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-33650491 [Accessed 1 May, 2016] 
72 High Level Conference ‘Protecting Civil Aviation Against Terrorists.’ Brussels, 27 September 2011 
 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/events/doc/2011-09-27-avsec-conclusions.pdf [Accessed 1 
May, 2016]. 
73 European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC) was given a legal basis in Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 677/2011 of 7 July 2011 on the ATM network functions (under Chapter IV, 
Articles 18 and 19) which set the requirements for its establishment and the responsibilities of the 
Network Manager to support the EACCC. 
74 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to 
ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union.  COM(2013) 48 
final. Brussels, 7 February, 2013. 
Agreement was reached on the Commission’s proposal on 7 December 2015 and the draft proposal for 
the NIS Directive was published 11 days later. On 14 January 2016, the EU’s Internal Market 
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global indicator in terms of the ability for coordination and cooperation under a 
specific legislative act and furthermore of the ability to add the same level through to 
specific industries and sectors.75 The Directive will also stand to address the fact that 
the EU is often criticised for championing user privacy, and has lagged behind the US 
when it comes to network security.76  That said, the comparison of the two is arguably 
not relative and misleading. In many ways, the EU has always demonstrated the 
ability and success of a union of countries coming together and achieving common 
goals. There remains no other example of a unity of countries accomplishing the same 
in the world in terms of agreements (including legislatively). From an aviation 
perspective, the degree of liberalisation across (the current) 28-individual States is 
held up to be an example of what is able to be achieved. And this may yet be 
translated through into cybersecurity.  
The purpose of the EU NIS Directive is to provide a legal measure to ‘boost the 
overall level of cybersecurity in the EU by:’ 
• ‘increasing the cybersecurity capabilities in the Member States 
• enhancing cooperation on cybersecurity among the Member States 
• ensuring a high level of risk management practices in key sectors (such 
as energy, transport, banking and health).’ 
In this respect it should be noted that transport is specifically noted in terms of being a 
vital sector. Hence, the Directive77 stands to build upon and develop previous 
legislation and agreements in relation to linked areas, such as telecommunications, 
security, etc. 
Within the overall EU Cyber Strategy78 - The Commission has included cybersecurity 
and e-privacy at the heart of its political priorities. Once again, on the one hand, this 
arguably reinforces the conflict between security and privacy, yet, on the other hand, 
it also stresses the alignment of these areas and hence the need for privacy to be 
adequately protected through appropriate security measures. Arguably, these are the 
same very issue that the computer giant, ‘Apple’ recently experienced in the US with 
regards to granting access to telephone information following a terrorist incident.79 
 
Trust and security remain at the core of the Digital Single Market Strategy which was 
launched in 2015; whilst, the European Agenda on Security for the period 2015-
                                                                                                                                                              
Committee voted to support the political agreement. 
75 It should be noted that the EU is active within an EU-US Working Group on Cybersecurity and 
Cybercrime, as well as an active participant of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). 
76 http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/What-the-EUs-cyber-security-bill-means-for-UK-industry 
[Accessed 1 May, 2016] 
77 Following the second reading it was adopted by the European Parliament on 6 July 2016.  
78 The Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: 
An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace. JOIN(2013) 1 final. Brussels, 7 February, 2013. 
79 This followed the attacks committed by a married couple with ties to fundamentalist jihadists in San 
Bernadino, California, in 2015.  
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202080 aims at Member States' cooperating in order to tackle security threats and 
establish common efforts in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and 
cybercrime. 
 
The implementation of NIS is seen as key legislative means to overcome the fact that 
networks are not bound by geography and nationality and hence the success of such a 
Directive may have key implications in the formulation of further legislative 
instruments, and hence, aviation cybersecurity.  But this again remains inevitably a 
regional initiative. 
 
6. CONCLUSION – facing the future 
There can be no denying that the day has come when one of the biggest threats to 
aviation safety and security lies in attacks, in, or related to, cyberspace.  Whilst at the 
present time these attacks may be said to be of a minor nature they are nevertheless 
increasing, and will no doubt also increase as to the consequences too. 
 
In a three-week period between 17 January, 2015 and 1 February, 2015, it is stated 
that US based airlines were targeted with more than 50 threats posted upon social 
media site.  These related to bomb threats, which resulted in a F-16 fighter jets being 
used to escort a Southwest flight and a Delta flight into Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson 
International Airport.81  Although these incidents were no doubt malicious, no bombs 
were actually found, and the Internet purely served as a means to scare and alert to the 
threat. Inevitably the interconnectivity of the Internet and the use of cyberspace poses 
a much greater risk to aviation – the infrastructure and to the aircraft flying above us, 
particularly in the form of a terrorist attack.  
 
Whilst the threat towards aviation has been apparent for some time, it has only more 
recently seen measures being introduced to reduce threats that have included a cyber 
dimension.  
 
There remains a magnitude of cybersecurity vulnerabilities to aviation, and future 
attacks are likely to see less direct intrusion measures, such as physically into the 
cockpit, where risks have been minimised due to lessons learnt from past events. 
Instead, catastrophic attacks will no doubt be perpetrated against aircraft through 
vulnerable access points, such as a gate links and ground support networks when the 
aircraft is on the ground, or inevitably eventually through a direct cyber-attack when 
the aircraft is inflight. Whilst technical solutions will aid to reduce these 
vulnerabilities, it will nevertheless result in a race to stay ahead in terms of ensuring 
that terrorists remain one step behind. In this respect, it should be noted, that this 
paper has not ventured into the realms of technology advancement – save for the 
vulnerability of such from the Internet. 
 
Inevitably, the solutions to tackle cybersecurity lie within the hands of numerous 
stakeholders, including governments and industries both within and external to 
                                                        
80 EU Press Release, ‘Commission takes steps to strengthen EU cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime.’ Strasbourg, 28 April 2015 
81 Rene Marsh, ‘Airlines Get More Than 50 Online Threats Since January 17.’ CNN Politics. 
 http://www.cnn. com/2015/01/28/politics/airlines-online-threats-50/ [Accessed 1 May, 2016]  
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aviation. But the challenge is not an easy one to tackle and resolve. 
Like aviation (particularly in respect to sovereignty of the skies above a State) the 
Internet and cyberspace suffers from national protectionism related largely to an 
intangible asset. There is also the dilemma in terms of privacy of Internet data and the 
sharing of this information – even when it comes to the implementation of security 
mechanisms to protect such. Hence, rule makers and regulatory bodies find 
themselves, in the main, only being able to rely on cooperative agreements and 
acceptable practices. 
In the first instance, the true awareness of the vulnerability faced by civil aviation 
needs to be realised and an effective multi-layered defensive and reactive framework 
needs to be established. 
At the present time ICAO identifies that, 
‘Each Contracting State must develop measures in order to protect 
information and communication technology systems used for civil aviation 
purposes from interference that may jeopardize the safety of civil aviation.’82  
But, like aviation, cybersecurity extends beyond boundaries and whilst defences can 
be created nationally and regionally through ensuring that there is some form of 
legislative approach, (including a national civil aviation cybersecurity policy) there is 
arguably the need for a civil aviation security architecture. This should encompass 
legislation and technology standards, extending into adjacent policies addressing 
shared risks relating to cybersecurity breaches (and inevitably terrorism).  
It is perhaps alarming to consider, that, in 2016, when the threats of cyber-attack are 
not only upon us but are evidently occurring – that such a tool and apparatus still has 
not been agreed. Particularly given, 
-     the 1994 Manual83 (followed by the 1999 UN Manual on Cybercrime84)  
- plus the UN Resolution of the same year (199485)  
- and in particular the later UN Resolution 55/6386 - which implied the need of a 
law enforcement mechanism to tackle the problems that ‘may’ arise from 
cyber-technology. 
Yet, in truth, aviation remains only a small part of this challenge – which necessitates 
determining how best to mitigate the risks of cyber-attacks to all critical 
infrastructure. That said, aviation, more so arguably than other critical infrastructure – 
save the Internet and cyberspace, extends well beyond national borders. In many 
ways, cyberspace and aviation share so many common factors and problems - both 
                                                        
82 Chapter 4 of Annex 17 – (2011 and 2014 amendments). 
83 United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-related Crime, International 
Review of Criminal Policy, Series M, Nos. 43-44 (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.94.IV.5. 
84 United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer Related Crime, International 
Review of Criminal Policy nos. 43 and 44 (1999).  
85 Resolution 49/158 of 23 December 1994 on strengthening the United Nations crime prevention and  
criminal  justice  programme. 
86 Also see: United Nations Resolution on Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information 
Technologies GA RES 55/63, UNGA 55th Session, 81st Plenary Meeting UN Doc. A/RES/55/63 
(2001).  
  27 
provide a means to communicate, one physically and the other remotely, and both 
have been instrumental in quickening the pace of globalisation. 
The very point that aviation stands at a crossroad87 is largely due to the fact that, in 
expanding so rapidly and providing the means to join the globe through quick travel, 
it has needed to use innovative technologies that have caused a dependency on 
information and communication provided via the cyberspace.  Inevitably, it is the 
same technology which is also vulnerable to attack and for which there is a lack of 
coordination to protect. 
Like other parts of humankinds history, it appears that lessons have not been learnt 
from past aviation events. In the case of Lockerbie, joint investigations were 
conducted by the US and UK authorities, however there were considerable judicial 
complications with regards to prosecutions. Lockerbie visibly showed the conflict of 
international and national law, and hence politics.88 It clearly tested the international 
legal order of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice following a 
terrorist attack; and, whilst there have been calls for a UN Treaty for a stand-alone 
International Court or Tribunal for Cyberspace, progression has been once again been 
slow in terms of achieving consensus and inevitably drive to pursue this.  However, 
this reluctance is not new.  The Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
relating to International Civil Aviation89 (The ‘Beijing’ Convention) was said by 
Abeyrante to be ‘a step forward in the right direction with the threat of cyber 
terrorism looming, affecting the peace of nations’ (Abeyrante 2011). Fox, furthermore 
added that ‘[a]ir transport could well be a target towards the erosion of that peace.’90 
Yet, whilst the Beijing Treaty may have been a ‘basis’ for responding to ‘new and 
emergent threats to security,’91 (for the first time perhaps, revealing the need to be 
pro-active - one of preparedness before an event) it is still not in force, and is unlikely 
ever to be so.92 Inevitably, this fact serves to emphasise international apathy in regard 
to being prepared and coordinated in the event of a cyber-terrorist attack. Ultimately, 
this may yet have a wider negative effect on adjacent policies and, in essence, to 
stability and peace.  
The world’s population increasingly relies on air travel, and airlines are expected to 
see an increase in travellers over an indefinite period, leading to a doubling of 
passengers and a forecasted 7 billion passengers taking to the skies by 2034.93 This 
equates to a ‘3.8% average annual growth in demand (2014 baseline year).’94 With a 
projected growth in air travel, this will inevitably lead to more aircraft occupying the 
skies. By 2018 the number of devices connected to Internet Protocol (IP) networks is 
                                                        
87 Supra. FN. 65. 
AIAA Decision Paper, ‘A Framework for Aviation Cybersecurity.’ August 2013 
88 See the discussions within: S. J. Fox (2015) CONTEST’ing Chicago origins and reflections: lest we 
forget! Int. J. Private Law, Vol. 8, No.1, 2015 pp 73-98. 
89 ICAO Doc. 9960, Signed at Beijing on 10 September 2010 [accessed 15 April 2016].   
90 Ibid - See the discussions within: S. J. Fox (2015) CONTEST’ing Chicago origins and reflections: 
lest we forget! Int. J. Private Law, Vol. 8, No.1, 2015 pp 73-98. 
91 ICAO Doc. 9960, Signed at Beijing on 10 September 2010 [accessed 15 April 2016].  
92 Ibid. 
93 IATA: Total passengers set to double to 7 billion by 2034. Press Release No.: 55. 26 November 2015 
94 Ibid. 
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expected to be almost twice as high as the global population.95  Hence, networks will 
continue to become more connected and electronic data will need to be further shared, 
thus intensifying risks for cyber-based attacks. All this is technology that aviation will 
continue to rely heavily on for efficiency and effectiveness on the ground and in the 
increasingly congested skies.  
Perhaps worryingly, likewise, globally, terrorism remains on the rise, with 2015 
witnessing the biggest annual rise in deaths caused by terrorism, with more than 
32,000 people killed in attacks around the world.96 Putting this back into an aviation 
context, this equates to almost a fivefold increase in fatalities since the events of 
9/11.97 Inevitably these factors should be a concern to every State and importantly 
serve as a stark reminder of the challenges that lay ahead. Disturbingly, it may take a 
cyber-terrorist atrocity (on the scale of 9/11) against aviation before adequate 
mechanisms and coordination is ultimately put in place.  And at such a time the world 
will no doubt question why it happened and why it wasn’t prepared when the signs 
and warning were clearly staring it in the face. 
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